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DEFAMATION IN EMPLOYMENT INVESTIGATIONS: BAHR V. BOISE 
CASCADE CORPORATION AND O’DONNELL V. CITY OF BUFFALO 
 
4 Wm. Mitchell J.L. & Prac. 1 
 
By: Kristin Berger Parker and Ellen G. Sampson* 
 
 
This paper looks at the kinds of statements that can be considered defamatory, the chilling effect that the 
tort of defamation has on the communication of important information, and also examines the similarities 
and distinctions between public and private defamation, focusing on the speech interests at hand.  It then 
discusses the privilege defenses that courts have developed to alleviate the chilling effect of the tort, both 
in the public and private contexts.  Finally, this paper considers how defamation and the privileges operate 
in the employment context. 
 
Two recent Minnesota cases illuminate these points.  Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corporation,1 the central case 
study for this article, is a Minnesota Supreme Court case that explores a common challenge for employers: 
how to investigate allegations of harassment or other misconduct made by co-employees without incurring 
liability for defamation.  The opinion in Bahr shows that adherence to an investigation plan that is designed 
to uncover information with minimal compromise to the privacy of employees will, in most cases, 
effectively insulate the company from liability.  Bahr, however, also shows what appears to be a growing 
trend: naming individual co-employees or managers as defendants.  In addition to presenting a potential 
disincentive to those who would otherwise report misconduct, this may provide multiple bites at the apple 
for plaintiffs looking for a deep pocket.  In the other case, decided by the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 
O’Donnell v. City of Buffalo,2 the court examined these ideas in the public official context, along with both 
constitutional and common-law privilege. 
 
 
I. Basics of Defamation 
 
 
Defamation is a common law tort that involves an act of harming the reputation of another by making a 
false statement to a third person.3 The purpose of the tort action is to compensate the plaintiff for real harm 
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1 Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 2009).review denied (Minn. Apr. 15, 2008). 
2 O’Donnell v. City of Buffalo, No. A07-203, No. A07-606, Slip Op. (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2008). 
3 See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defamation). 
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done to his or her reputation and, often, economic harm that results from third parties changing their 
relationships with the plaintiff based upon a false and negative statement.  “In order for a statement to be 
considered defamatory, it must be communicated to someone other than the plaintiff, it must be false, and 
it must tend to harm the plaintiff's reputation and to lower her estimation in the community.”4 
 
In general, statements of pure opinion cannot give rise to a cause of action for defamation.5 Speech must 
be sufficiently factual to be evaluated for truth or falsity in order to give rise to liability.6 Additionally, only 
false statements are punished by the doctrine; truth, no matter how harmful, is a complete defense to 
defamation.7 Conversely, a false statement cannot be excused on the basis of innocent intent or mistake.8 
Therefore, fear of liability for damages from defamation may have a chilling effect on communication of 
important information. 
 
The doctrine of defamation has been shaped by a tension between the understanding, on the one hand, that 
language has real consequences and that false statements should not be freely permitted and, on the other 
hand, that free speech is accorded a high value in our legal system.  Speech is the way that ideas are 
communicated and information is shared.9  Since defamation necessarily implicates expressive conduct, 
certain doctrines have arisen to limit liability.  Some of these limitations are encompassed in the elements 
of defamation. 
 
 
A.        Public and Private Defamation 
 
 
There is an important difference between defamation in the public context and defamation in the private 
context.  First Amendment concerns are most readily apparent when speech impacts matters of public 
concern or public figures.  In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,10 the United States Supreme Court rejected 
the idea that, since defamation is a private tort action, it does not implicate state power.  The Court noted 
that the label of “libel” did not necessarily take speech out of First Amendment protection.11 Then, the court 
explicitly considered the broad tension between an individual’s right not to be defamed and the importance 
                                                          
4 Lee v. Metro. Airport Comm’n, 428 N.W.2d  815, 819 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 
5 See,53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander; Injurious Falsehood § 78 (2009). 
 
6 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Corp., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (statement of opinion only actionable if it “reasonably 
implies false and defamatory facts”). 
 
7 Frank J. Cavico, Defamation in the Private Sector: The Libelous and Slanderous Employer, 24 U. Dayton L. Rev. 
405, 456 (1999) (“[I]f a defendant employer can demonstrate that the defamatory assertions are in fact true, the 
employer prevails, regardless of any adverse consequences to the employee’s reputation or ability to obtain other 
employment.”). 
 
8 See Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (defamation). 
 
9 See generally Cavico, supra note 7, at 459-61 (private); see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 267-
72 (1964) (public). 
 
10 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
11 Id. at 269. 
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of speech on public issues:  “Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and 
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and 
public officials.”12 Ultimately, after a review of First Amendment doctrine, the court determined that “the 
constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State's power to award damages in a libel action 
brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.”13 
 
By definition, private defamation, on the contrary, deals with the affairs of private individuals.  As such, 
the balance of interests in permitting actions for defamation does not implicate the First 
Amendment.  Nonetheless, even if private speech is not protected by the constitution, chilling private 
speech has negative consequences.  For instance, the flow of information about the conduct of individuals 
is critical for conducting business.14 This is clear in the types of behavior that are central to this article: 
sharing information regarding decisions to hire and fire.  Both employers and employees have interests that 
are protected by free exchange of information..15 
             
 
B.  Defenses to Defamation 
 
 
Since the falsity requirement is determined with reference to the statement rather than the speaker’s 
mindset, it does not in itself insulate unintentionally false statements in the common law test.  “Defamation 
at common law was generally regarded as a strict liability type of tort, principally because the prima facie 
case thereto did not include a requirement of fault.”16 Given the above-mentioned concerns about stifling 
speech on matters of public importance and public figures, both First Amendment law and tort law have 
developed concepts to encourage speech on matters of public importance.  These concepts are embodied in 
two privilege defenses to the tort of defamation.  The first defense, constitutional privilege, applies to 
defamation in the public context.  The second defense, often referred to as the qualified privilege, applies 
to private defamation.  In fact, both defenses are qualified privileges, and may be defeated by a showing 
that the defendant abused the privilege.  Thus, each defense has a corresponding test for malice, in which 
the speaker’s mindset is relevant to whether the speech gives rise to liability. 
 
 
 1. Public Defamation: Constitutional Actual Malice 
 
 
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, petitioners challenged a civil judgment against them for defamation.17 
Petitioners had published an editorial that criticized the acts of certain public officials in Alabama, which, 
                                                          
12 Id. at 270 (emphasis added). 
 
13 Id. at 265. 
 
14 See generally Cavico, supra note 7, at 465-74, for a discussion of various business interests related to sharing 
information regarding employees. 
 
15 See id. 
 
16 See Cavico, supra note 7, at 413. 
 
17 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. 
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Petitioners stated, constituted “an unprecedented wave of terror” against African Americans and civil rights 
workers.18  The challenged Alabama law in that case, which governed liability for defamation of a public 
officer concerning his official acts, was based on the common-law strict liability standard for defamation.19 
Although Alabama law had several statutory prerequisites to a defamation action, once those were satisfied, 
“the defendant ha[d] no defense as to stated facts unless he c[ould] persuade the jury that they were true in 
all their particulars.”20  The Supreme Court held that Alabama’s statutory regime did not adequately protect 
the freedom of speech and, effectively, permitted state courts to shut down relevant political discourse.21 
As a matter of first impression, the Court held that defendants have a qualified privilege to speech regarding 
public figures, which is based in constitutional protections for speech.22 
 
Thus, in order for defamation of a public figure regarding his or her official conduct to be actionable, the 
plaintiff must show the privilege was abused.  Such a showing requires that the plaintiff establish that the 
defendant acted with “constitutional actual malice,” in a test that takes its name from the case where it was 
first famously applied: the New York Times standard for constitutional actual malice restricts an award of 
damages for defamation of public figures to instances where a speaker makes a statement with “with ‘actual 
malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not.”23 Under this test, unlike the common law, negligence as to the truth or falsity of such a statement is 
insufficient to make the speaker liable for damages24 This test, however, arising from the First Amendment, 
only protects speech regarding public figures and matters of public importance. 
 
 
 2.  Qualified Privilege & Common Law Malice 
 
 
Even if a particular incident or person is not in itself a matter of public importance, however, free flow of 
communications still has a beneficial value in many contexts.  Thus, another defense is available even in 
the private context.  When the social value of communication is high, the law permits the application of 
qualified privilege: “[A] statement is qualifiedly privileged if it is made upon proper occasion, from a proper 
motive, and based upon reasonable or probable cause.”25 “The privilege results from a belief that statements 
                                                          
18 Id. at 256-57. 
 
19 See id. at 261. 
 
20 Id. at 267. 
 
21 See id. at 265.  See also id. at 279 (“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his 
factual assertions-and to do so on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount-leads to a comparable ‘self-
censorship.’ Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant, does not mean that 
only false speech will be deterred.”). 
 
22 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. 
 
23 Id. at 286. 
 
24 See id. at 288. 
 
25 Bolton v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 527 N.W.2d 149, 155 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 540 
N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1995). 
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made in particular contexts or on certain occasions should be encouraged despite the risk that the statements 
might be defamatory.”26 
 
The privilege operates in much the same way as the constitutional privilege.  If a defendant shows a proper 
occasion, motive and reasonable cause for the statement, the qualified privilege applies and insulates the 
speaker from liability for defamation unless the privilege is lost through abuse.27 The plaintiff has the 
burden to prove abuse of the privilege, which occurs where the speaker has actual malice.  In Minnesota, 
actual malice that defeats the qualified privilege is common law malice, which goes to the intention of the 
utteror, and occurs when a statement is motivated by ill will, spite, or for the purpose of injuring the 
plaintiff.28  Actual malice “may be shown by direct proof of personal spite or by ‘intrinsic evidence,’ such 
as ‘the exaggerated language of the libel, the character of the language used, the mode and extent of 
publication, and other matters in excess of the privilege.”29 
 
 
II.  Employment Defamation and the Qualified Privilege 
 
 
Employment defamation may arise both during employment, such as in an investigation or disciplinary 
action related to an employee’s behavior, or after employment, when an employer is asked to comment on 
an employee’s “work record or qualification.”30 Defamation claims are often brought in conjunction with 
wrongful discharge claims or after an employer has given a poor recommendation to a potential future 
employer.31  A negative reference or employment action may cost an employee his good reputation or 
livelihood.  Perhaps due to the significant impact of such statement, defamation that affects a person in his 
or her employment is defamation per se, meaning that the plaintiff need not prove special damages in order 
to prevail.32 
 
While potentially damaging, free flow of such reputational information is highly sought by future 
employers.33  In response, courts and legislatures have broadly recognized that the qualified privilege 
                                                          
26 Id. at 155. 
 
27 See id. at 156. 
 
28 See id.  
 
29 Id. (quoting Bauer v. State, 511 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Minn. 1994)). 
 
30 Donald P. Duffala, Annotation, Defamation: Loss of Employer’s Qualified Privilege to Publish Employee’s Work 
Record or Qualification, 24 A.L.R.4th 144, 147 (1983) (defining “work record” as “any fact bearing on a person’s 
former or present employment” and “qualification” as “any fact regarding a person’s capability of functioning as an 
employee in his current or prospective employment”). 
 
31 See Cavico, supra note 7, at 408. 
 
32 See Lee v. Metro. Airport Comm’n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 
33 See Cavico, supra note 7, at 467 (“In particular, employment references can promote the interests of the 
prospective employer, who wants to make a knowledgeable and well-reasoned hiring decision, as well as the 
interests of third parties, such as future fellow employees and customers, who want to work with and be served by 
careful, capable, and conscientious employees.”). 
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applies to comments regarding work record and qualifications.34   For instance, in recognition of the 
importance of truthful employment references, 35  Minn. Stat. § 181.967 provides some protection for 
employers who provide information to potential future employers about “acts of violence, theft, or illegal 
conduct.”36 Although the statute itself states that it will not protect false and defamatory information, it 
essentially codifies the qualified privileges: the employer will be liable only if it “knew or should have 
known the information was false” and “acted with malicious intent to injure the current or former 
employee.”37  Thus, the Minnesota statute effectively lowers the employer’s burden to show that the 
statement was privileged. 
 
Moreover, such statutory privileges have been extended to communications between an employer and a 
current or former employee.  In 1986, the Minnesota Supreme Court held, “It is in the public interest that 
information regarding an employee’s discharge be readily available to the discharged employee and to 
prospective employers, and we are concerned that, unless a significant privilege is recognized by the courts, 
employers will decline to inform employees of reasons for discharges.”38 This interest was codified in 
Minn. Stat. § 181.933, which requires employers to communicate a truthful reason for discharge to former 
employees upon a written request.39 That statute gives employers strong protection against a defamation 
action based in such statements to the former employee.40 
 
Further, the contours of the employer’s qualified privilege in the context of investigations leading to 
disciplinary action are relatively well-defined.  After surveying a number of employment defamation cases, 
one article found that the operation of qualified privilege is relatively uniform and that “employers will be 
afforded a qualified privilege to publish false and harmful accusations regarding employees if the employer 
(1) actually or reasonably believed, after a careful investigation, in the truth and accuracy of the matter, (2) 
the communications were directed specifically to serving a business interest of the employer-publisher, 
recipient, third party, or shared interest, or the public interest, and (3) the material was published with a 
proper motive, with a proper limited scope, and to appropriate parties only.”41 
 
There is robust caselaw in Minnesota examining the qualified privilege in cases where the employer 
disciplined an employee for misconduct.  For instance, in Wirig v. Kinney Shoes, a terminated employee 
                                                          
34 See Duffala, supra note 30, at 173(“Generally, [a qualified privilege] attaches to publications made by an 
employer concerning a current or former employee.”). 
 
35 See, e.g. Hornback v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 752 N.W.2d 862 (Wis. 2008); see, e.g. Sigler v. Kobinsky, 762 
N.W.2d 706 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (employers may face liability where they do not share information regarding 
former employees who may pose a danger to coworkers or third parties in the future). 
 
36 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.967, subd. 2-3 (2009). 
 
37 See id. at subd. 2. 
38 Lewis v. Equitable Life Ins. Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 1986). 
 
39 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 181.933, subd. 1 (2009). 
 
40 See id. at subd. 2 (“No communication of the statement furnished by the employer to the employee under 
subdivision 1 may be made the subject of any action for libel, slander, or defamation by the employee against the 
employer.”). 
 
41 Cavico, supra note 7, at 473. 
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brought a suit claiming, among other things, that her employer had defamed her when it terminated her 
during a staff meeting.42 Wirig and two other employees had been accused by another employee of stealing 
shoes from her employer.43  Without investigating the reports or engaging in any other consideration beyond 
a meeting between the store managers, the three managers decided to fire the accused employees during an 
all-staff meeting.44 The Minnesota Court of Appeals both rejected the purpose of the communication—to 
use Wirig as an example to other employees—and found that the employer had not acted with probable 
cause since the employer did not reasonably investigate the accusations.45 
 
Interestingly, the first prong of the qualified privilege test presumes either that an investigation has been 
completed46 or that decision makers have decided to forgo an investigation.47 At that point, it is easier to 
determine whether the employer has acted with due care than in an ongoing investigation.  However, 
defamation plaintiffs sometimes allege harm not from the ultimate outcome of an investigation or an actual 
adverse employment action, but from statements made during the course of an investigation.  For instance, 
in McBride v. Sears & Roebuck, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered allegedly defamatory statements 
made during an investigation into an employee who had been accused of shoplifting.48 The allegedly 
defamatory statement in McBride was made when agents of the employer interrogated McBride, stating, 
“We know you have been taking things from Sears and not paying for it.”49 Thus, McBride alleged that she 
was defamed by the investigation itself. 
 
Nonetheless, the court found that the qualified privilege applied: “Communications between an employer's 
agents made in the course of investigating or punishing employee misconduct are made upon a proper 
occasion and for a proper purpose, as the employer has an important interest in protecting itself and the 
public against dishonest or otherwise harmful employees.”50 McBride gave rise to a qualified privilege, 
which may be lost if it is abused.51 The McBride court also acknowledged that this privilege is limited, but 
found that it applied in that case because the employer had shown that it had probable cause to believe that 
McBride had stolen the merchandise and McBride “did not attempt to establish actual ill will.”52 Other 
cases are not as clear cut as McBride: courts need to take a more nuanced approach to statements made (1) 
                                                          
42 See Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 448 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), rev’d on other grounds 461 
N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 1990). 
 
43 See id. at 529. 
 
44 See id.  
 
45 See id. at 533. 
 
46 See Cavico, supra note 7, at 473. 
 
47 See, e.g., Wirig, 448 N.W.2d at 532. 
 
48 See McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 235 N.W.2d 371 (Minn. 1975). 
 
49 Id. at 373. 
 
50 Id. at 374. 
 
51 See generally supra section I.B.2. 
 
52 McBride, 235 N.W.2d at 97-98. 
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prior to an investigation, such as an initial complaint, and (2) during the conduct of an investigation, before 
the result of the investigation is clear. 
 
 
III.  Case Studies – Qualified Privileges to Employment Defamation 
 
 
Two recent employment defamation cases in Minnesota courts, O’Donnell v. City of Buffalo and Bahr v. 
Boise Cascade Corporation, clarify the application of the qualified privilege to employment defamation by 
(1) disaggregating potential defamation claims against co-workers from claims against the company, and 
(2) analyzing the propriety of statements made before and during an employment investigation, without the 
benefit of hindsight from a completed investigation.  This paper reviews the cases chronologically, briefly 
outlining these developments as they appear in O’Donnell and treating Bahr in more detail.  O’Donnell 
illustrates the operation of both the constitutional privilege and the qualified privilege in the context of 
public employment.  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis in Bahr provides a sophisticated application 
of the qualified privilege to an employment defamation claim that arises out of a modern harassment 
complaint and the subsequent investigation. 
 
 
A.  O’Donnell v. City of Buffalo 
 
 
In O’Donnell v. City of Buffalo, a former volunteer fire captain brought defamation claims against the City, 
the fire chief, and six firefighters based on allegedly defamatory statements made by the six firefighters and 
republished by the fire chief and the City.53 The court found that O’Donnell was a public figure, and that 
the allegations of the six firefighters and subsequent investigation of those allegations were done in the 
course of his employment. 54  Thus, the court examined both the constitutional and common law 
privileges.  The court distinguished the employer (the City and the fire chief) from O’Donnell’s co-
employees (the six firefighters) and analyzed each separately. 
 
First, the court analyzed whether the defendants had abused the constitutional privilege, making the 
allegedly defamatory statements “either knowing that they were false or with reckless disregard for whether 
they were true.”55 The court found that O’Donnell had presented sufficient evidence in the form of affidavits 
and deposition testimony, not detailed in the appellate court’s opinion, to show an issue of material fact as 
to whether the six firefighters “had no factual basis” for their statements and, thus, knowingly or recklessly 
made the false statements.56 But the court held that since the City and fire chief “republished the letter in 
order to investigate the allegations,” there was no evidence that they had knowledge of the truth or falsity 
of the statements.57 The court did not conduct a searching examination of the state of mind of the City or 
                                                          
53 O’Donnell v. City of Buffalo, No. A07-203, A07-606, slip op. at 1-2 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2008). 
 
54 See id. at 10. 
 
55 Id. at 3 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). 
 
56 See O’Donnell, No. A07-203, A07-606, slip op., at 11. 
 
57 See id. (emphasis added). 
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the fire chief; rather it inferred that they could not have had knowledge of the truth of the statements prior 
to an investigation.58 
 
The court then analyzed the common law privilege.  Although it had already held that the City and the fire 
chief were not liable for defamation, due to the constitutional privilege, it also considered whether they had 
a qualified privilege to republish the firefighters’ allegations.59  Restating the general rule of privilege as 
applied to the employment context, the court stated, “Generally, statements made during the course of an 
employer’s investigation into misconduct . . . are privileged.”60 In its discussion of malice, the court 
suggested that constitutional actual malice would not satisfy the common law malice test under Minnesota 
law.61  The court then found that O’Donnell had not presented more than conjecture or speculation as to the 
mindset of the fire chief (and, by imputation, the City).62 Thus, O’Donnell’s claims against his employer 
were barred by both constitutional and common law privilege. 
 
Contrary to the rule stated above with regarding to employment defamation, in examining O’Donnell’s 
claims against the six firefighters, the court stated, “Clearly, the six firefighters did not publish the letter 
[containing the allegedly defamatory statements] under circumstances that would give rise to the defenses 
of either absolute or qualified privilege.”63 Thus, since the court had already found that there was evidence 
of constitutional actual malice, it reversed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for the 
firefighters.64 
 
 
B.  Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corporation 
 
 
In contrast with the unusual factual scenario in O’Donnell, the problem considered by the court in Bahr v. 
Boise Cascade Corporation65 arose from a common factual situation.  In that case, the question was whether 
Bahr’s co-employee abused the qualified privilege by making statements that caused the employer to 
conduct an investigation into alleged harassment, and whether Bahr’s employer abused the privilege when 
it engaged in publication of potentially defamatory statements to non-management or supervisory 
employees during an investigation into his behavior.66 These questions are central to the operation of 
qualified privilege in the context of a modern employment investigation. 
                                                          
58 See id. at 5-6. 
 
59 See O’Donnell, No. A07-203, A07-606, slip op.. at 11-12. 
 
60 Id. at 12. 
 
61 See id.  
 
62 See id. at 13. 
 
63 Id. at 14. 
 
64 See id. 
 
65 Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 2009). 
 
66 See id. at 920, 923. 
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Bahr contends with an important and increasingly common situation that is influenced by incentives that 
were not well developed at the time of McBride and Kinney.  Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights 
Act67 (MHRA) place incentives on employees to report harassment or other instances of discrimination, 
and on employers to investigate and remedy potentially unlawful conduct.  In most instances, employees 
who are subject to harassment by coworkers must report it to the employer and give the employer the 
opportunity to remedy the situation before the employer will be liable.68 Moreover, employer liability for 
harassment also depends on whether employers are engaging in sufficient steps of monitoring and 
correcting behavior of employees, the incentives for thorough investigations increase.69  When examining 
whether an employer has effectively responded to allegations of harassment and discrimination, courts often 
consider whether the employer disciplined (up to termination) employees who engaged in such conduct.70 
Correspondingly, such disciplinary investigations and actions have led to allegations of employment 
defamation.  Employees who are suspended or consequently discharged may be motivated by lost wages in 
addition to reputational harms or emotional distress to bring suit against their employers, and the stakes are 
high for both parties. 
 
 
1.  Factual Background 
 
 
The events that underlie Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corporation take place at Boise Cascade Corporation’s 
(“Boise”) paper mill located in International Falls, Minnesota71  In a community of 6,703 people, the paper 
mill has more than 800 employees and is the largest employer in the community.72 LeRoy Bahr was 
employed as a stores keeper at the plant, along with individual defendant Stacey Rasmussen, and 
Rasmussen’s uncle, Eural Dobbs, who worked as a supervisor.73 
 
                                                          
67 Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 363A.01-.41 (2004). 
 
68 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 
(1998).  The Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense provides that an employer will not be liable for coworker 
harassment if it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and the 
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided.  The 
affirmative defense outlined in Faragher and Ellerth is also applicable to claims under the MHRA.  See Frieler v. 
Carlson Marketing Group, Inc., 751 N.W.2d 558 (Minn. 2008). 
 
69 See id.  
 
70 See, e.g., Monson v. N. Habilitative Servs., No. A05-1102, 2006 Minn. App. LEXIS 298, at *23-24 (Minn. Ct. 
App. March 28, 2006), rev. denied 2006 Minn. LEXIS 339 (Minn. May 24, 2006) (“Factors to consider when 
determining the adequacy of the employer’s action include the amount of time elapsed between the notice of 
harassment and the remedial action, the options available to the employer, disciplinary action taken against the 
harasser, and whether or not the measures ended the harassment.”). 
 
71 Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 913. 
 
72 See International Falls Minnesota Community Guide, http://www.lakesnwoods.com/InternationalFalls.htm (last 
visited March 24, 2010). 
 
73 See Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 913. 
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The evidence presented at trial revealed a history of tension between Bahr and Rasmussen.74 That history 
escalated on September 27, 2001, when three stores keepers told Rasmussen that they had heard a rumor 
that he was involved in an extramarital affair with another employee, R.B.75 Based on the reports of the 
stores keepers, Rasmussen concluded that Bahr had started the rumor; Rasmussen and Bahr were scheduled 
to work together that day76 At that point, Rasmussen became agitated and said, “I have to work with that 
lazy, fat f***er,” apparently referring to Bahr.77 
 
Rasmussen then went to speak with R.B., who was already aware of the rumor and had been told that Bahr 
was the source.78 R.B. then called Bahr, who denied starting the rumor.79 During that call, another stores 
keeper, J.P, admitted that he had started the rumor.80 Rasmussen was present during the calls, but testified 
that he did not learn at that time with whom R.B. spoke or who had actually started the rumor81  Rasmussen 
testified that he learned that J.P. started the rumor “within a few weeks” thereafter.82 
 
Later that same morning, Bahr, J.P., and another stores keeper confronted Rasmussen about the phone call.83 
Rasmussen testified that he felt harassed and threatened, and he told the other stores keepers that he was 
going to report them to Human Resources84 Both J.P. and Bahr testified that they tried to speak with 
Rasmussen several times following this confrontation to “patch things up” and to ask Rasmussen whether 
he had reported the incident.85 
 
The evidence suggests that Rasmussen did not make a report prior to October 18, 200786 On that day, Bahr 
attempted to talk to Rasmussen about whether Rasmussen had scheduled a meeting with Human 
Resources.87 After that conversation, Rasmussen called his uncle, Dobbs, and told Dobbs that Bahr kept 
                                                          
74 See id. 
 
75 See id. 
 
76 See id. 
 
77 See id. 
 
78 See id. 
 
79 See id. 
 
80 See id. at 913-14. 
 
81 See id. at 914. 
 
82 See id. 
 
83 See id. 
 
84 See id. 
 
85 See id. 
 
86 See id. 
 
87 See id. 
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confronting him, that Bahr “‘had approached him . . . in a threatening manner,’” and that he was constantly 
“‘intimidated and harassed.’”88 Dobbs, a supervisor, reported Rasmussen’s statements to Barb Johnson, a 
Human Resources coordinator. 89  At Johnson’s instruction, Dobbs met with Rasmussen again. 90 
Rasmussen’s account to Dobbs during that second meeting was similar to the first conversation, and Dobbs 
testified that Rasmussen was agitated and upset during the conversation. 91   After Dobbs reported 
Rasmussen’s account to Johnson, Johnson instructed Dobbs to escort Bahr from the premises.92 Dobbs did 
so, and Bahr was placed on “investigatory suspension.”93 When Bahr asked why he was being escorted off 
the property and suspended, Dobbs told Bahr that he could not talk to him.94 
 
That afternoon, a second Human Resources coordinator, Betty Leen, met with Rasmussen and 
R.B.95  During this interview, and another interview with Johnson, Rasmussen made the following allegedly 
defamatory statements: 
 
 Bahr started the rumor about an affair between Rasmussen and R.B.;96 
 
 Bahr “yells and shouts and he is almost to the point of physical violence;”97 
 
 Bahr “will do as little as possible because he is mad at Boise;”98 
 
 Rasmussen was “worried” that Bahr would “put something in” his lunch bucket or garage;99 
 
 Bahr threatened Rasmussen “yelling” and “saying [you’re] in deep shit!” and “’you’re going to 
get your day!’”100 
                                                          
88 Id. at 914-15 (ellipsis in original). 
 
89 See id. at 915. 
 
90 See id. 
 
91 See id. 
 
92 See id. 
 
93 Id. 
 
94 See id.  Boise’s Human Resources Department Manager, Jack Strongman, testified that, according to Boise’s 
policy, Bahr should have been told why he was asked to leave.  Id. at 915 n.2. 
 
95 See id. at 915. 
 
96 See id. 
 
97 Id. 
 
98 Id. 
 
99 Id.  On another occasion, Rasmussen made substantially the same allegation, “that he was ‘afraid of [Bahr] 
planting something’ in his lunch or garage ‘now that [Rasmussen] has stepped up for [himself].’”  Id. at 916. 
 
100 Id. 
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Johnson and Leen’s re-publication of Rasmussen’s allegations occurred on several occasions between 
October 18 and October 25, 2007.101 During the investigation, Johnson and Leen interviewed three other 
stores keepers about Rasmussen’s allegations of harassment and that Bahr engaged in work slow downs102 
Further, Johnson asked Bahr about Rasmussen’s allegations in the presence of a union representative.103 
Bahr denied all of Rasmussen’s allegations. 104    Despite Bahr’s denials and mixed results of the 
investigation, Bahr was presented with a written “last-chance” agreement, in which he was required to 
acknowledge Rasmussen’s allegations of harassment.105  Bahr was also suspended without pay for three 
days, although that suspension was removed from his record and his pay was refunded after a union 
grievance.106 
 
 
2.  Court of Appeals 
 
 
The court of appeals reviewed the trial court’s denial of defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law 
(JMOL), in which defendants argued, inter alia, that their statements were protected by the qualified 
privilege.107 The parties did not dispute whether the qualified privilege existed; the only dispute was as to 
whether Rasmussen and/or Boise had abused the privilege, acting with actual malice.108  Explaining the 
common-law actual malice standard, the appeals court explained that malice is a state of mind, and requires 
“intent to cause harm through falsehood.”109  The court then outlined the ways in which a plaintiff my show 
actual malice: “[M]alice can be proven by extrinsic evidence of ill feeling, or intrinsic evidence such as 
exaggerated language, ‘the character of the language used, the mode and extent of publication, and other 
matters in excess of the privilege.’”110 
 
In order to determine whether Boise acted with malice, the court considered whether Dobbs or two HR 
employees, Johnson and Leen, acted with malice that could be imputed to the corporation.  The court 
determined that even if Dobbs had ill will toward Bahr, he “did not author the allegedly defamatory 
                                                          
101 See id. at 915-17. 
 
102 See id. at 916.  Evidence of questions about work slow downs were suggested by Johnson’s notes in which one 
employee said that “Bahr had said ‘not to work so fast,’” but another employee “said that Bahr had never said 
anything to her about slowing down work.”  Id. 
 
103 See id. at 915-16. 
 
104 See id. at 916, 
 
105 See id. 
 
106 See id. at 916-17. 
 
107 See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., No. A07-1353, 2008 WL 2966433, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008). 
 
108 See id. at *5. 
 
109 Id. 
 
110 Id. 
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statements,” and his state of mind could not be imputed to those who did.111  Next, the court rejected Bahr’s 
suggestion that Johnson and Leen showed malice by asking questions during the investigation about Bahr’s 
work habits—a line of inquiry that Bahr contended was irrelevant to Rasmussen’s harassment complaint.112 
It found that insufficient to show malice, since “[a]n employer has an important interest in protecting itself 
against employees whose conduct harms its operations.”113 Since the employer was acting to protect its 
interest as a corporation, therefore, its conduct did not show intent to harm Bahr. 
 
Next, the court considered whether Bahr had shown sufficient evidence that Rasmussen had acted with 
malice.  Bahr contended that Rasmussen’s malice toward him could be shown by Rasmussen’s comment 
that Bahr was a “lazy, fat f--ker” and by the “fabricated and exaggerated nature” of Rasmussen’s 
claims.114  The court summarily held that the insult was insufficient to show malice, since a personality 
conflict is not always sufficient to show ill will.115   It further concluded that Rasmussen’s allegedly 
exaggerated statements did not support a finding of malice, since malice cannot be demonstrated by mere 
falsity, and Bahr presented no evidence of exaggerated language.116 Thus, the appellate court held that 
neither Rasmussen nor Boise acted with malice sufficient to overcome the qualified privilege. 
 
  
3.  Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
 
In its review of the appellate court’s decision reversing the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for 
JMOL, based on its finding that the defendants did not act with malice, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
focused its inquiry on four statements that Rasmussen made to Dobbs117 and again during interviews with 
Boise Cascade’s Human Resources Department, and the company’s re-publication of those statements 
during interviews.118 With respect to the company, the court’s analysis considered “(1) the manner in which 
the Boise Human Resources Department undertook the investigation, and (2) manifestations of ill will by 
Eural Dobbs.”119 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s holding that Bahr had not produced sufficient 
evidence of Boise’s malice to overcome the company’s qualified privilege.120 In its analysis, the court first 
                                                          
111 Id. 
 
112 See id. at *6. 
 
113 Id. 
 
114 Id. 
 
115 See id. 
 
116 See id. 
 
117 See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., 766 N.W.2d 910, 920 (Minn. 2009). 
 
118 See id. 
 
119 Id. at 923. 
 
120 See id. at 926. 
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examined the formal investigation into Rasmussen’s complaints.121 The court’s conclusion focused heavily 
on Boise’s adherence to its Corporate Policy regarding harassment investigations.122 Relevant to the court’s 
opinion was that the company policy states that any harassment will trigger a “prompt and thorough 
investigation.”123  Based on this policy, the court found Bahr’s claims that Leen fabricated additional 
complaints to spur an investigation were either false or irrelevant and not supported by the record.124 The 
court found that limited republication of Rasmussen’s allegations was also based on the corporate policy 
and made only to those employees “that the company could have reasonably believed would provide some 
information about the truth or falsity” of his claims.125 Further, the court relied on the fact that Boise 
“interviewed Bahr twice during [the] investigation to obtain his version of events,” and that uncontradicted 
testimony showed that no final disciplinary decision was made until the investigation was complete.126 The 
court concluded that the formal conduct of the investigation did not show evidence of malice. 
 
Next, the Court noted that Dobbs’ malice could be imputed to the company under the theory of vicarious 
liability if Dobbs’ malice was “so mingled with his regular work and the scope of his employment that it 
must follow that the wrongful act is done in the course of his employment.”127 Ultimately, the court 
concluded that, since Boise’s policies required an investigation of any harassment allegations “irrespective 
of Dobbs’ feelings about Bahr,” Dobbs’ alleged ill will could not have motivated the company’s conduct.128 
After a review of the evidence presented, the court held, “the only motivating force for Boise’s statements 
revealed in the evidence is Boise’s legitimate pursuit of the internal corporate investigation.” 129 
 
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the appellate court erred when it concluded that 
Bahr had not shown legally sufficient evidence of Rasmussen’s malice to sustain a verdict that Rasmussen 
was liable for defamation.130 The court examined four pieces of evidence in the record and held that, in 
combination, that evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that Rasmussen acted with malice.131 
Initially, the Court disagreed with the appellate court regarding the relevance of Rasmussen’s comment that 
                                                          
 
121 See id. at 923. 
 
122 See id. at 924. 
 
123 Id. 
 
124 See id. 
 
125 Id. 
 
126 Id. 
 
127 Id. at 925 (quoting Freidell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 232, 203 N.W. 974, 976 (Minn. 
1925)).  However, the court did not explicitly consider whether Boise was vicariously liable for Rasmussen’s 
defamatory statements. 
 
128 Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 925. 
 
129 Id. at 926. 
 
130 See id. at 922. 
 
131 See id. at 922. 
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Bahr was a “lazy, fat f---ker.”132 Although this evidence may not have been sufficient on its own to show 
malice, the court held that it was “direct proof of personal spite” and relevant to the question of malice.133 
The court also held that Rasmussen’s reports regarding Bahr’s work habits were evidence of malice, stating 
that statements regarding “other matters in excess of the privilege” are probative of malice.134 Unlike Boise, 
the employer, Rasmussen did not have a legitimate interest in Bahr’s work habits, thus his comments “could 
support the conclusion that Rasmussen’s motivation . . . was a desire to get his co-worker in trouble . . . 
.”135 Further, the court held Rasmussen’s statement that Bahr “needed a wake up call” was similarly 
probative of his intent to cause trouble for Bahr, rather than to remedy the harassment he allegedly faced.136 
 
Finally, the court examined Bahr’s contention that evidence that Rasmussen knew of the falsity of his 
allegations at the time he made them.  Contrary to the holding in O’Donnell and the appellate court in this 
case, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Rasmussen’s argument that such evidence was 
irrelevant.137  The court explicitly stated that the “higher” New York Times constitutional actual malice 
standard could also satisfy the common law malice required to defeat the qualified privilege.138   Based on 
evidence presented by Bahr that Rasmussen was aware of J.P.’s admission that he had started the rumor on 
September 27, 2007, the Court concluded that there was a fact question as to whether Rasmussen had made 
some of his allegations of harassment knowing that they were false.139 Taken together, the court held that 
the trial court properly denied Rasmussen’s motion for JMOL based on the qualified privilege.140 
 
 
IV.  Impact of Bahr 
 
 
A.  Human Resources/Investigations 
 
 
Large employers are likely to engage in more frequent disciplinary investigations, and have the most need 
for a sophisticated investigation process.  Bahr, however, suggests that Minnesota courts are cognizant of 
                                                          
132 Id. at 920-21. 
 
133 Id. at 921 (citing Stuempges v. Parke, Davis & Co., 297 N.W.2d 252, 258 (Minn. 1980), for the proposition that 
evidence of prior “hostile encounters between the plaintiff and defendant” are relevant to state of mind). 
 
134 Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 921. 
 
135 Id. 
 
136 Id. 
 
137 See id. at 922. 
 
138 Id. 
 
139 See id. 
 
140 See id.  The Court, however, remanded to the appellate court for determination of several other issues raised by 
Rasmussen.  On remand, the appellate court rejected Rasmussen’s additional contentions and affirmed the district 
court’s holding.  See Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corp., A07-1353, at *11 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 15, 2009) (Loislaw, 
Minn. Case Law). 
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the duties that employers have to investigate complaints and that, if an investigation is performed in 
accordance with a company’s appropriate guidelines, employers will be able to avoid liability.141 For a 
company creating investigation guidelines, one of the lessons of Bahr is that Human Resource 
investigations should be tightly controlled.  Although by law, defamation only requires minimal 
publication, “the standard by which the defamatory meaning of the communication is to be determined as 
well as the size of the community” is relevant to both liability and damages.142 As the Minnesota Supreme 
Court emphasized, the qualified privilege depends on whether publication of potentially defamatory 
material is limited to those with a need to know.143 In an environment such as the Boise paper mill in 
International Falls, where a large proportion of the community is employed, the need for discretion is 
enhanced. 
 
An interesting question that was not raised by the parties was whether escorting an employee off the grounds 
at the outset of an investigation might be actionable defamation.  Although Minnesota courts recognize 
defamation by action,144 Bahr did not allege this theory of defamation.  Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Bahr, the company did not seek information from him before escorting him from the building 
and, contrary to policy, Bahr was not informed of the reason for his suspension before escorting him from 
the building.  In previous decisions, it has been established that the qualified privilege may apply to 
escorting an employee from the premises.145  Such a privilege likely exists where there have been reports 
that an employee may pose a physical danger to coworkers, such as the reports made by 
Rasmussen.  However, the question remains whether a company abuses the privilege where, as in Bahr, it 
escorts an employee on any such report without seeking a statement from the accused employee or even 
informing that employee of the substance of the accusation.146 
 
 
B.  Reporting Co-worker Misconduct 
 
 
Bahr and O’Donnell, however, provide somewhat less comfort to employees.  These two cases in isolation 
do not clearly establish a trend, but this line of case law will clearly incentivize plaintiffs to name co-
employees in defamation suits.  On the facts of the case, Bahr’s result, holding that Rasmussen may be 
found liable for defamation, appears fair.  However, if this trend goes too far, it may create a troubling 
disincentive for employees to report harassment or other perceived problems for fear that they will be 
personally liable.  Bahr provides some reassurance, suggesting that if an employee who limits his complaint 
                                                          
141 See Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 925. 
 
142 See Cavico, supra note 7, at 423. 
 
143 See Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 923. 
 
144 See Bolton v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 527 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (escorting employee from 
building conveys message that employee “was dishonest and was not to be trusted to leave the building 
unaccompanied”). 
 
145 See id. 
 
146 Cf. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 448 N.W.2d 526 (holding that statements made as a public firing and as a way to 
punish and embarrass an employee are not a proper motive to justify a claim of qualified privilege). 
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to harassment will likely be protected by the qualified privilege unless there is very strong evidence of 
malice.147 
 
Whether a co-employee’s privilege will extend to other complaints, however, is unclear.  In O’Donnell, the 
court stated, “Clearly, the six firefighters did not publish the letter under circumstances that would give rise 
to the defenses of either absolute or qualified privilege.”148  It is unclear on what basis the O’Donnell court 
so concluded, and Bahr may cut against the appellate court’s holding.  Nonetheless, the current case law 
does not plainly establish when a co-employee (or a subordinate, in the case of O’Donnell) may have a 
qualified privilege to complain about another employee’s performance. 
 
If more plaintiffs follow the lead of Bahr and O’Donnell, courts may be faced with additional questions as 
to what kinds of complaints may properly fall into the qualified privilege.  As this case law is established, 
one potentially key factor would be to focus on when the employee is privileged in the context of his or her 
employment.149 Thus, if the employee complains qua employee—about a concern that legitimately impacts 
his or her conditions of employment—the privilege should apply.  Had the court in O’Donnell applied this 
analysis, it may well have found that the six firefighters had a qualified privilege: while they were not 
subject to harassment, if their complaints had merit, O’Donnell’s behavior posed a safety risk to them. 
 
 
C.  Vicarious Liability 
 
 
Further, after Bahr, one open question is to what degree a single employee’s actual malice can infect an 
employer’s investigation.  If more plaintiffs go the route of the Bahr and O’Donnell plaintiffs, naming a 
number of individuals in addition to the company as defendants, there is likely to be a robust discussion of 
vicarious liability in defamation cases.  In Bahr, the court broke this discussion out from a general 
evaluation of whether the employer acted reasonably in responding to complaints.150 As noted above, the 
Bahr court considered the actions of Dobbs and certain Human Resources personnel with respect to whether 
Boise had defamed Bahr.151 However, the court did not consider whether Boise could be vicariously liable 
for Rasmussen’s defamatory statements.  This approach appears to import standards often used to evaluate 
employer liability for harassment under Title VII and related laws, where an employer is not liable for the 
harassment of a mere co-employee unless it has been otherwise negligent in preventing or responding to 
harassment.152 Perhaps, under Bahr, if the employer thoroughly investigates the defamatory statement of 
an employee, it “cures” the defamation. 
 
                                                          
147 See Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at 910. 
 
148 O’Donnell, A07-203, A07-606, slip op. at 14. . 
 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 100-102. 
 
150 See Bahr, 766 N.W.2d at  925. 
 
151 See id. at 923. 
 
152 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (West 2010). 
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This approach perhaps serves to better insulate the employer than the approach taken in Smits v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, where, based on the actions of several individual employees in contravention of company policy, 
Wal-Mart was held liable for defamation when the employees called 911 to report a potential shoplifter.153 
Whether Bahr overrules Smits is unclear.  In that case, the employee was an assistant manager and was 
arguably acting within the scope of his official duties.154 If so, Bahr’s analysis may have imputed his actions 
to the employer.    However, the court in Smits did not explicitly analyze vicarious liability.155 Employer 
liability is a fact-intensive question that will be determined on a case-by-case basis; however, Bahr’s 
rigorous application of vicarious liability will likely be beneficial for employers. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 
Bahr v. Boise Cascade Corporation provides useful tools for analyzing employment defamation claims that 
arise from modern corporate disciplinary investigations.  The well-reasoned opinion also provides practical 
guidance for employers in designing disciplinary policies and suggests that employers would be well-served 
to keep in mind liability for defamation as well as liability for harassment and/or discrimination when they 
design investigation policies.  The opinion also suggests a more nuanced approach to liability in defamation 
cases.  Plaintiffs may have a cause of action against an individual within the company without imposing 
liability on the corporate defendant.  On the other hand, when defending defamation claims made in the 
context of employment, employer defendants would be well-served to focus on whether malice can properly 
be imputed to the company, putting plaintiffs to their burden of proof on vicarious liability. 
 
                                                          
153 525 N.W.2d 554, 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (performing analysis of employee’s actions and knowledge and 
conclusorily imputing liability on employer). 
 
154 See id. at 556. 
 
155 See id. at 557-59. 
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